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United States v. Kozminski: On the Threshold
of Involuntary Servitude
I. INTRODUCTION
The motivation behind adoption of the thirteenth amendment
could scarcely be doubted at the time of its passage. The nation, re-
cently reunified after four years of bloody civil war, was controlled
by a Congress composed entirely of northern unionists. They were
the victors and the spoil they claimed was abolition of the South's
"peculiar institution."' "Neither slavery nor involutary servitude...
shall exist within the United States.. ."2 With these words the abo-
litionists embedded their long cherished goal into the Constitution.
At a minimum, the amendment forbids chattel slavery of the kind
known in the antebellum south. It has also been accepted that the
amendment gives Congress the power to reach "badges and incidents
of slavery,"3 thus providing a constitutional basis for limited civil
rights legislation.4 Courts have recently been challenged, however,
to give definitive content to the words themselves. 5 The task was to
1. For a comprehensive discussion of the thirteenth amendment and its history,
see tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Con-
summation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171
(1951). Professor tenBroek presents an exhaustive history of the congressional debates
preceding the amendment's passage. See also Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amend-
ment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L.REV. 1294, 1299-1300 (1969). "The framers'
debates were directed more to the desirability of emancipation than to the meaning of
the language .... Attention was focused south of the Mason-Dixon line [and] .. .[i]f
the understanding of the framers alone were to determine the amendment's scope, it
would be largely obsolete today." Id See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Section 1 of the amendment provides: "Neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." Section 2 of the amendment provides: "Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id.
3. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). The scope of the amendment as it re-
lates to civil rights legislation continues to expand. See generally Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Note, supra note 1, at 1300.
4. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
5. United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1986); United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855
(1984); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bibbs, 564
F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978); United States v. Shackney,
333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
formulate a definition of "involuntary servitude" capable of applica-
tion to complex situations-situations much less obvious than nine-
teenth century chattel slavery, but no less insidious to their
twentieth century victims. The search involved numerous considera-
tions: the framers' intent,6 construction of enabling statutes passed by
various congresses, 7 and constitutional concerns regarding the crimi-
nal defendant's right to receive notice of proscribed conduct.8
In United States v. Kozminski,9 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of what is encompassed by the term "involuntary servitude."
The Court focused on construing the statutes under which the de-
fendants were prosecuted. Its primary concerns were those of con-
gressional intent and constitutional notice. The Court interpreted
the term narrowly, concentrating on the means of subjection and
holding that only physical or legal coercion could render a servitude
"involuntary" under the current enforcement statutes.10
This note will examine the opinion of the Court as well as those of
concurring Justices Brennan and Stevens in light of both the
Supreme Court's own precedent and the past split among the circuit
courts of appeals. It will attempt to show that the Court, as the re-
sult of an overly technical construction of the current enforcement
statutes, unnecessarily restricted the thirteenth amendment and its
enabling statutes by improperly focusing on the means of subjection
instead of the condition produced thereby.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO KoZMINSKI
A. Supreme Court Precedent
Although Kozminski represents the first time the Court has ren-
dered a definition of "involuntary servitude," it is not the first time
the Court has expounded upon the term.' x The amendment and vari-
ous enabling statutes have been discussed in a variety of other con-
6. See, e.g., United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); see infra notes
37-51 and accompanying text; see also tenBroek, supra note 1, at 177.
7. Although the amendment is self-executing, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20,
and involuntary labor may not legally exist in the United States, "(w]ithout imple-
ment[ing legislation,] the executive branch of the federal government would be power-
less to act against [such] conditions." Brodie, The Federally-Secured Right to be Free
from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367, 390 (1952). The current implementing statutes are
contained in sections 1581-1588 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1581-1588 (1969). The "useful and usable statutes" are section 1581 (peonage), sec-
tion 1583 (enticement into slavery or involuntary servitude), and section 1584 (holding
or selling into involuntary servitude). Id.
8. See, e.g., Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1454-55.
9. 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988).
10. Id. at 2763.
11. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Having quoted the amendment, the Court noted "[t]he mean-
ing of this is as clear as language can make it." Hodges, 203 U.S. at 16.
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texts. In the Slaughter-House Cases,12 with the amendment "almost
too recent to be called history,"13 the Court found that "[i]ts two
short sections seem hardly to admit of construction."'14 The result of
the case was a rather straightforward holding that restrictions on the
use of property cannot constitute involuntary servitude within the
amendment. The Court believed the amendment clearly contem-
plated only personal servitude. 15 In reaching its decision, however,
the Court engaged in an extended discussion of congressional intent
and the language chosen to effectuate it. Of most significance defini-
tionally was its recognition that "[t]he word servitude is of larger
meaning than [the word] slavery," and the "obvious purpose" of in-
cluding the former was to forbid "all shades and conditions" of the
latter.16
Following this initial foray into the amendment's terminology, the
Court was not called upon to construe the language itself until near
the turn of the century. In Plessy v. Ferguson,17 the argument was
made that segregation was a form of servitude.18 This argument,
however, was not "strenuously relied upon," and the Court consid-
ered its negative holding "too clear for argument."' 9 The Court fo-
cused on slavery as a legal status, "the ownership of mankind as a
chattel, or at least the contol of the labor and services of one man for
the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal
of his own person, property and services."20
At the time of the amendment's passage, the framers were con-
cerned that the former slave states would concoct schemes by which
the newly-freed slaves could be returned to a condition of subjec-
tion.21 Their concern eventually proved to be justified,22 and while
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
13. Id at 71.
14. Id. at 69.
15. Id.
16. Id
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18. Id. at 542-43.
19. Id. at 542.
20. Id (emphasis added).
21. See tenBroek, supra note 1, at 173-74. Discussing the legislative history of the
amendment in detail, the author argued both its sponsors and opponents recognized
that the objective "was not only to free the negroes but to 'make them our equals
before the law.'" Id at 174 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 179-80, 216
(1865)). But see Note, supra note 1, at 1297 ("The northern public, which the framers
represented . . . was accustomed to distinguishing a strictly 'theoretical right to life,
liberty, and property' from protection for Negroes' enjoyment of these rights equally
with white men.").
691
passage of the fourteenth amendment abrogated the grossest and
most overt of these evasions,23 some of the devices lingered on. One
such device was peonage, which typically involved the working off of
money previously advanced by an employer. 24 Congress sought to
eradicate this practice in 1867 with the Anti-Peonage Act, but peon-
age simply took on new guises and continued unabated in certain ar-
eas of the country.
In C7yatt v. United States,25 the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Peonage Act based on Congress's power to enforce the thir-
teenth amendment. In doing so, the Court stated that "[t]his amend-
ment denounces a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or
authority by which it is created."26 In Pollock v. William,27 under
authority of the Act, the Court struck down one of the means used to
evade the Peonage Act. In Pollock, a Florida law created a presump-
tion of fraud from mere failure to perform a labor contract. The re-
sult of the law was twofold: employees could be imprisoned for
simply walking off the job, or were kept from doing so by the threat
of such consequences. The Court noted: "The undoubted aim of the
Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti-peonage Act
was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely
free and voluntary labor throughout the United States."28
These general principles concerning the scope of the amendment
and its implementing statutes constituted the only Supreme Court
guidance available at a time when borderline cases requiring a pre-
cise definition of involuntary servitude began arising in the lower
courts.29 Needless to say, this guidance was of limited precedential
value because the outer limits of the term "involuntary servitude," as
22. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872). The Court noted that
"[a]mong the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the [newly readmitted]
States... were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and bur-
dens .... " Id.
23. The fourteenth amendment gave Congress power to reach these discrimina-
tory laws since they constituted the clearest form of state action. See id& at 80-81.
24. The Supreme Court defined peonage as "a status or condition of compulsory
service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master .... [P]eonage, how-
ever created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude." Clyatt v. United States,
197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).
25. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
26. Id. at 216.
27. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
28. Id, at 17 (emphasis added). Pollock represents a culmination in terms of the
Court's unwillingness to accept any form of state-condoned involuntary servitude. The
other peonage cases are collected and discussed at some length. Id. at 7-13.
29. Along the way, the Court had excepted specific types of involuntary servitude
as being within the letter but not the spirit of the law. See, e.g., Butler v. Perry, 240
U.S. 328 (1916) (six days compulsory roadwork required of all men by state law not
involuntary servitude but within police power of state); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275 (1897) (statute punishing desertion from a commercial ship did not render servi-
tude involuntary).
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applied to a state of personal subjugation, was never truly in issue.30
B. Construction and Definition of the Conspiracy and Holding
Statutes in the Courts of Appeals
Prior to Kozminski, numerous district courts3' and roughly half
the circuit courts of appeals32 had addressed the issue of what consti-
tutes "involuntary servitude." However, most did so under circum-
stances that did not require giving the term specific content. 33 Thus,
any support for an expanded definition from these courts would
properly be characterized as dicta.34 Nevertheless, two cases, United
States v. Shackney35 and United States v. Mussry,36 are especially sig-
nificant as they required such a decision.
In Shackney, the defendant had induced several Mexican families
to travel to Connecticut to work on his chicken farm.37 Prior to ar-
ranging transportation from Mexico for one of these families, the
Oroses, Shackney drafted written employment contracts and promis-
sory notes for Mr. Oros to sign.38 The contract provided for a seven-
day work week for a term of two years at an initial salary of $160 per
month.39 The promissory notes covered Shackney's outlay for trans-
portation and were co-signed by a friend of the Oroses who owned his
own home in Mexico.40
30. For further analysis of these cases, especially those arising under the Peonage
Act, see Brodie, supra note 7, at 377-83; Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need for
a More Flexible Approach, 18 RUTGERs L. REV. 65, 71-79 (1964); Note, Involuntary Ser-
vitude: Modern Conditions Addressed in United States v. Mussry, 34 CATH. U.L. REV.
153, 162-66 (1984) [hereinafter Involuntary Servitude]; Note, supra note 1, at 1303-06.
31. United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Peonage Cases, 123 F.
671 (M.D. Ala. 1903); Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866); see also Bro-
die, supra note 7, at 386.
32. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
33. The vast majority of the cases represented clear holdings by actual physical
force. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1022 (1986); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
34. For example, the Court stated in Bibbs: "In a prosecution for involuntary ser-
vitude the law takes no account of the means of coercion." Bibbs, 564 F.2d at 1167.
However, since the case involved actual physical abuse and threats, the statement was
not necessary to the Court's decision.
35. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
36. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
37. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 477. Shackney had found it difficult to find American
workers due to the necessity of a seven-day work week. Id.
38. Id
39. Il
40. Id. These took the form of 12 notes of $100 each, considerably more than the
actual cost of transportation. In addition, Shackney allegedly made Oros sign six addi-
Upon arrival, Oros and his family found the living conditions dras-
tically different from Shackney's representations. 41 Oros and his eld-
est daughter testified that from the day of their arrival they wanted
to leave, but they never communicated this desire to Shackney.42
There were no allegations of force and there were long periods of
time in which the Oroses were alone while the Shackneys were away
from the farm.43 Testimony indicated, however, that Shackney
threatened the family with deportation and collection of the promis-
sory notes from the co-signer in Mexico.44 In addition, the children
did not attend school and the Oroses were actually paid only ten dol-
lars during the entire period as Shackney simply tore up promissory
notes when their wages became due.45
Judge Friendly began his analysis by first reviewing the legislative
history of section 1584 and then reviewing Supreme Court decisions
under the peonage statute. Finding both inconclusive,46 he proceeded
further into the history of the term "involuntary servitude," looking
to the Northwest Ordinance from which it was taken.47 He
concluded:
tional $100 notes simply to gain leverage over the family once they had arrived. Id at
477-78.
41. Id at 478. "[T]he walls were of corrugated cardboard; and there were holes in
the floor .... ." Id
42. Id. at 479. According to the government, the Oroses were concerned that they
would be deported or that Shackney would foreclose on the co-signer's home.
43. Id.
44. Id. The government's case primarily rested on these two threats. The trial
judge had instructed the jury that enforcement of the notes was within Shackney's
rights and could not be held against him. Judge Friendly not only approved of the in-
struction, but felt that the government's claim, that Oros's will was overcome by the
threat of deportation, was weakened by Oros's testimony about his desire to protect his
friend. Id at 486 n.17.
45. Id. at 478.
46. Id. at 481-83. As a matter of statutory construction, Judge Friendly found that
the "search must be for the meaning of § 1584 rather than of its two parents." Id. at
482. The paucity of legislative history surrounding section 1584, however, made such a
search illusive. Thus, noting that the comment to the code indicated no "attempt to
change existing law," he still read the statute as "covering the same type of compul-
sory holding as was proscribed by its parent statutes, comparable to the holding which
was a necessary element of the crime of peonage." Id. Having come full circle, he re-
viewed the Supreme Court's decisions under the peonage statutes but found no "clear
answer." Id at 483. Interestingly, no other court addressed the legislative history of
the statute until the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1189-92
(6th Cir. 1987), cif'd, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988).
For other reviews of the history of section 1584 and the peonage cases, see Brodie,
supra note 7, at 376-83 (focusing on the current enforcement statutes and the need for
modernization) and Shapiro, supra note 30, at 71-82 (critiquing Shackney).
47. The language of the thirteenth amendment was taken almost verbatim from
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, believed to have been written by Thomas Jefferson.
Shackney, 333 F.2d at 483; see also Note, supra note 1, at 1298-99 n.34 (broader lan-
guage based upon the French constitutions was proposed by Senator Sumner but re-
jected in favor of "good old Anglo-Saxon language" that would be "perfectly well
understood").
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This survey indicates to us that the prime purpose of those who outlawed "in-
voluntary servitude" in the predecessors of the 13th Amendment, in the
Amendment itself, and in statutes enacted to enforce it, was to abolish all
practices whereby subjection having some of the incidents of slavery was le-
gally enforced, either directly, by a state's using its power to return the ser-
vant to the master . . . or indirectly, by subjecting persons who left the
employer's service to criminal penalties.
4 8
In his judgment, while a threat of deportation came "close to the
line," it had not rendered the Oroses choice to stay involuntary under
this standard.49
Judge Dimock objected that Judge Friendly's focus on the means
of subjugation was unwarranted by the text of the statute, improper
as a matter of policy, and "arbitrary." He felt instead that the proper
focus was on the victim: "Where the subjugation of the will of the
servant is so complete as to render him incapable of making a ra-
tional choice, the servitude is involuntary within the terms of the
statute and it is only where there is such subjugation that the servi-
tude is involuntary."5 0 He nonetheless concurred, finding that on the
facts of the case the jury could not properly have found "willful sub-
jugation" even within his broader interpretation of the statute. 51
Similarly, United States v. Mussry52 involved a group of defend-
ants who had lured poor Indonesians to the United States to work as
household servants and gardeners.53 The indictment charged that
upon arrival their passports and airline tickets were taken from
them54 and that they were required to work seven days a week, up to
fifteen hours a day, for very little money.5 5 An allegation was also
made that the defendants told the servants they would be arrested
should they attempt to leave the houses where they were em-
ployed.56 The district court, accepting Shackney's definition of "in-
voluntary servitude," dismissed all counts charging peonage, slavery,
or involuntary servitude because the indictment did not allege the
use or threatened use of law or force.5 7
48. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 485-86 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 486.
50. Id. at 488 (Dimock, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Dimock, J., concurring).
52. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
53. Id. at 1450.
54. Id. These acts had greater significance than might otherwise be expected, be-
cause in Indonesia, citizens are required to carry a pass at all times and are subject to
arrest if caught without it. The government alleged the defendants were aware of this
fact. See Involuntary Servitude, supra note 30, at 174-75 (quoting appellant's brief).
55. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1450.
56. Id.
57. Id. A necessary element of involuntary servitude is a "holding."
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the facts alleged were suf-
ficient to constitute a finding of involuntary servitude if proven at
trial.58 Significantly, the court did not rely on nor even address the
legislative history of the enforcement statutes, assuming instead that
use of the thirteenth amendment's terminology in the statute was in-
tended to give it coextensive reach.59 Taking into consideration "the
realities of modern economic life,"6 0 the court easily concluded that
Shackney's definition was "too narrow to fully implement the pur-
pose of the [thirteenth] [a]mendment." 6 1 Relying in part on Judge
Dimock's concurring opinion in Shackney62 and on similar dicta in a
line of Fifth Circuit cases,63 the court rejected Judge Friendly's
means-based definition in favor of one focusing on the status or con-
dition of the victim.64 According to the court, involuntary servitude
could be found if an individual employed "improper or wrongful con-
duct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person to be-
lieve that he or she has no alternative but to perform the labor."65
Under this standard, the government would have to show both actual
subjugation and that the alleged conduct would have had the same
effect on "a reasonable person of the same general background and
experience" as the victim. 66
The defendants asserted that if Shackney were abandoned, the
statutes would be rendered constitutionally void for vagueness.67 On
this issue, the court first noted the dual rationale in requiring suffi-
cient definiteness in statutes defining criminal offenses: namely, to
discourage "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" and to inform
"ordinary people ... what conduct is prohibited."68 The court also
noted that in passing upon a vagueness challenge not involving the
first amendment, the court may consider only "the facts of the case
at hand."69 The issue was thus reduced to whether these defendants
58. Id. at 1455-56.
59. Id. at 1451; see Involuntary Servitude, supra note 30, at 178-79 (criticizing this
failure as a significant weakness which could minimize the case's influence).
60. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1451.
61. Id. at 1452.
62. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concur-
ring); see supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoted supra
note 34). "It is common ground among.., all the courts... that have interpreted
§ 1584 that it encompasses, at a minimum, the compulsion of labor via the use or threat
of physical or legal coercion." United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2765-66
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Fifth Circuit's statements are properly charac-
terized as dicta since the evidence showed physical compulsion.
64. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1452-53.
65. Id. at 1453.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 1454.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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had adequate notice that their conduct was prohibited.70 Conceding
that the language was "not the most precise," the court nonetheless
felt that since close questions of interpretation alone do not render a
statute vague, the statute's mens rea requirement largely alleviated
any vagueness concern.7 1 As to the defendants, the court believed
that they had fair notice that the allegedly intentional and successful
subjugation of their Indonesian servants was unlawful.72
At the time Kozminski came before the Sixth Circuit, the only two
courts of appeals to squarely confront the issue had reached diametri-
cally opposed conclusions. The Second Circuit, in Shackney, con-
cluded as a matter of statutory construction that objectively
verifiable force, either legal or physical, must be proven to find invol-
untary servitude. The Ninth Circuit, in Mussry, concluded as a mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation that the thirteenth amendment
made no such distinction concerning the means of subjugation;
rather, the amendment prohibited actual subjugation regardless of
how it was brought about.
III. UNITED STATES V. KozMINsKI
A. Facts and Findings in the Lower Courts
Ike Kozminski brought Louis Molitoris to his farm in Chelsea,
Michigan in the early 1970's.7 3 Molitoris had been living on the
streets of Ann Arbor, having previously spent several years in a
mental institution.7 4 He had an I.Q. of about sixty.75 At the farm he
joined Robert Fulmer, whom the Kozminskis had picked up walking
down a road several years earlier.76 Fulmer's I.Q. was approximately
sixty-seven.77
Officials, having been alerted by a former employee of the Kozmin-
skis to Fulmer's and Molitoris' presence on the farm, found the two
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1455.
72. Id. The court summarized the point as follows: "It is difficult to argue that a
person did not have' notice that certain conduct was illegal when the offense requires
that the conduct be improper or wrongful and that the actor intend that the conduct
have a coercive effect." Id.
73. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (1988).
74. Id. at 2756.
75. Id at 2755. In theory, the average I.Q. is 100. An I.Q. below 70 generally indi-
cates mental retardation. See Eysenck, The Nature and Measurements of Intelligence,
in J. FREEMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GIFTED CHILDREN 115, 126 (1985).
76. Id. at 2755-56.
77. Id. at 2755.
men in 1983 living in squalor,78 poor health, and relative isolation.7 9
The Kozminskis, Ike, Margarethe, and their son John, were charged
with both conspiracy to hold the men in involuntary servitude8 0 and
with having succeeded in doing so.8 1 There was evidence the men
had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse and that Molitoris
was threatened with institutionalization.8 2 In addition, the govern-
ment argued that the substandard living conditions, isolation, and se-
vere work load8 3 had resulted in a form of brainwashing that held
Fulmer and Molitoris as "psychological hostages."84
The trial court accepted the government's theory of the case, which
rested, squarely on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mussry, and
charged the jury accordingly.8 5 Ike and Margarethe were convicted
as charged; John was convicted only of conspiracy.8 6
'The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc,8 7 reversed and remanded. Cit-
ing Shackney and Mussry, the court first noted that the circuit courts
were "squarely in conflict" on the issue.88 Although they agreed on
the end result necessary to find involuntary servitude-that the vic-
tim must believe there was no choice but to serve-the Second Cir-
cuit limited punishable means of coercion to physical or legal
78. Id. Judge Merritt, writing for the Sixth Circuit, said: "The trailer they occu-
pied was filthy, having no running water, a broken refrigerator and maggot infested
food." United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1180, 1188 (6th Cir. 1987). Apparently the
Kozminskis' explanation for this was that "Fulmer and Molitoris were responsible for
cleaning their own quarters." I& at 1189.
79. The government alleged that the Kozminskis discouraged visitors from talking
to the men and told them their families did not care about them, when in fact attempts
were made to contact them. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1189. It also appeared that the
two men left the farm on several occasions and were brought back by the Kozminskis
or their employees. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2756; see also id at 2767 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). The statute reads in relevant part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his hav-
ing so exercised the same ... They shall be fined at not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Id.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1982). The statute reads: "Whoever knowingly and willfully
holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any
other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id
82. Testimony at the trial included "descriptions of the men being slapped, choked
and kicked on several occasions." Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1189.
83. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2756. The men apparently worked 7 days a week for
up to 17 hours a day.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2756-57. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Musary).
86. Id. at 2757.
87. A three-judge panel of the court affirmed the convictions. That judgment was
vacated when the court granted en banc review. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1189.
88. Id
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intimidation while the Ninth Circuit specifically refused to accept
such limitations.8 9 Rejecting both of these conclusions, the Sixth Cir-
cuit created yet a third definition. Although it accepted Shackney's
rationale for placing limitations on the means of coercion criminally
punishable, the court felt that the legislative history allowed for a
third method of compulsion based upon the need for protection of
certain vulnerable classes. The Padrone Act, a predecessor to section
1584, was enacted specifically to provide protection to children
brought into the country and held illegally.90 The system it con-
demned involved a supposed voluntary consent which Congress and
the courts, finding it to be a sham, punished as involuntary
servitude.91
Based upon its reading of the Padrone Act and the cases interpret-
ing it, which the court believed to be incorporated into section 1584
since that statute represented a mere consolidation,92 the court added
a third method of coercion to that found in Shackney to constitute a
holding in involuntary servitude:
[T]he master's use of fraud or deceit to obtain or maintain services where the
servant is a minor, an immigrant or one who is mentally incompetent.... [I]t
must be shown that the servant is under a disability to recognize or resist the
master's fraud or deceit because of the servant's vulnerability as a member of
one of these classes. 9
3
Because "[t]he District Court's rulings and instructions would appear
to criminalize general psychological coercion without fraud, deceit,
force, or legal coercion and would include all individuals... not just
the particularly vulnerable classes referred to," the court reversed
89. Id at 1189-90.
90. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2762. The act took its name from "padrones," men
who brought young Italian children to the United States where they were put to work
as beggars or street musicians. The statute was aimed at, and limited in application to,
those who "knowingly and wilfully [brought] into the United States . . . any person
inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any other country, with intent to hold such person
• . . [to] involuntary servitude." Id.
91. Several courts and articles provide detailed analysis of the Padrone Act, its
history and its effect on interpretation of section 1584. See Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at
2761-63; Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1189-92; United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d
Cir. 1964); Shapiro, supra note 30, at 79-81; Involuntary Servitude, supra note 30, at
158-62. For an interesting view of the law immediately following its enactment, see
Brodie, supra note 7, at 383-88 (assuming the statute would apply "where one causes
another by force, fraud or intimidation to enter and remain in another's employ-
ment." (emphasis added)).
92. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1191. "We believe it is a mistake to read § 1584 in isola-
tion from the older statutes which produced it." Id.
93. Id. at 1192. The court also relied on the contract principle of the incapacity of
minors and the mentally ill to buttress its conclusion that these groups needed special
protection. Id. at 1193.
and remanded for a new trial.94
In a scathing dissent, Judge Guy, joined by three other members of
the bench, charged that "the majority has rewritten rather than in-
terpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1584."95 Concerned not by the breadth of the
proposed definition but rather with its lack of flexibility, the dissent-
ers favored the definition offered by Judge Dimock's concurring
opinion in Shackney.96
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
Speaking for the majority, Justice O'Connor relied upon a highly
technical construction of the statutes under which the defendants
were prosecuted. The first of these authorizes prosecution for con-
spiracy to violate any federally-secured right of a citizen of the
United States.97 The second authorizes criminal punishment for
"knowingly and willfully" holding another in involuntary servi-
tude.98 In construing the first, the Court focused on the precedent
concerning involuntary servitude; to construe the second, it looked to
congressional intent.
The Court had previously construed the conspiracy statute to pro-
hibit "only intentional interference with rights made specific either
by the express terms of the Federal Constitution or laws or by deci-
sions interpreting them."9 9 The Court saw its task as determining
the scope given the thirteenth amendment in its prior decisions.
From "the general intent to prohibit conditions 'akin to African slav-
ery,' "100 the Court readily deduced an intent to prohibit physical
compulsion.101 Then, "looking behind the broad statements of pur-
pose to the actual holdings" of its cases, the Court found they had all
rested on some form of legal coercion. 102 Based on these findings,
the Court determined that in order to make out a case under this
statute, the government must show that "the use or threatened use"
of physical or legal compulsion was involved in the conspiracy.10 3
Turning to the second statute specifically aimed at holdings in in-
voluntary servitude, the Court found that borrowing this "pivotal
phrase" of the amendment "logical[ly], if not inevitab[ly]" leads to
94. Id, at 1193.
95. Id. at 1213 (Guy, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1212 (Guy, J., dissenting). See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text
(discussion of Judge Dimock's opinion).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
98. Id. § 1584. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (1988).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2760.
102. Id
103. Id. at 2761.
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the conclusion that they were intended to have the same reach.104
The Court felt constrained as a matter of statutory construction,
however, to limit the statute's reach to "the understanding of the
Thirteenth Amendment that prevailed at the time of [the statute's]
enactment."l0 5 This inevitably led to the same analysis and conclu-
sion already reached under the conspiracy section. 00 The Court be-
lieved its result was confirmed by the legislative history of the
statute which represented a consolidation of two earlier enactments,
the original Slave Trade statute of 1818 and the Padrone statute of
1874.107 The Court found the former to reach only slavery as such
and the latter to be consistent with the result it had reached.lo8
The government argued that the focus should be on the victim. It
contended that involuntary servitude could be brought about by any
means, including psychological coercion, as long as the victim either
felt he had "no tolerable alternative" but to submit or had been de-
prived of the power to make a rational decision.109 The Court re-
jected the argument on two grounds. First, in drawing a line
between criminal conduct and that which was merely reprehensible,
the test left too much discretion to prosecutors and juries." 0 Second,
its inherently subjective focus on the victim's state of mind would
provide "almost no objective indication" of what conduct it prohib-
ited, thus invoking constitutional vagueness and notice concerns."1
The Court was careful to indicate its holding did not imply that
"evidence of other means of coercion, or of poor working conditions,
or of the victim's special vulnerabilities, is irrelevant."11 2 The Court
held simply. that "the use or threatened use of physical or legal coer-
cion is a necessary incident" of involuntary servitude,1 3 a threshold
which must be reached before a conviction can be obtained under the
statutes.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, and Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joined, filed separate opinions,
104. I&
105. Id (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id at 2761-63. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.




112. Id. at 2765.
113. Id.
both concurring in the judgment but departing significantly from the
majority's reasoning.
Justice Brennan had a different view of congressional intent, one
which focused not on a technical construction of the statutes but on
the problem Congress sought to eradicate and the language it chose
to effectuate its goal.114 He began with the premise that the Court's
vagueness concerns, "however serious, are not textual concerns, for
the text suggests no grounds for distinguishing among different
means of coercing involuntary servitude." 15 He too found the gov-
ernment's "no tolerable alternatives" test and its focus on the vic-
tim's state of mind to be too subjective.1 16 He was concerned,
however, that recent attempts to compel involuntary servitude were
not limited to legal or physical coercion. 117 He concluded that, even
where these were not present, a sufficiently objective guide would be
to focus on the slave-like conditions Congress sought to eradicate.
Congress clearly intended to encompass coercion of any form that actually
succeeds in reducing the victim to a condition of servitude resembling that in
which slaves were held before the Civil War. While no one factor is disposi-
tive, complete domination over all aspects of the victim's life, oppressive
working and living conditions, and lack of pay or personal freedom are the
hallmarks of that slave-like condition of servitude.1 1 8
As this definition differed from that of the trial court's jury instruc-
tions, Justice Brennan concurred in the remand.119
Justice Stevens, in his brief opinion, argued that Congress most
likely "intended the definition to be developed in the common law
tradition of case-by-case adjudication."1 20 As to the vagueness con-
cerns implicated by such an approach, he analogized involuntary ser-
vitude to the Sherman Act's "restraint of trade" standard, concluding
that the involuntary servitude standard was no more vague.121 He
thus opted for a "totality of the circumstances" approach. Although
he believed that under such an approach the defendants had notice
that their conduct was prohibited and were therefore fairly con-
114. Id, at 2769 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2766 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2769 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. Id at 2767 (Brennan, J., concurring). "[T]his case and others readily reveal
that the typical techniques now used to hold persons in slave-like conditions are not
limited to physical or legal means." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). He then chronicled
some of these techniques: trickery, isolation, "creating debt that is greater than the
worker's income," disorienting the victims and controlling every detail of their lives, or
weakening them "with drugs, alcohol, or by lack of food, sleep, or proper medical
care." He concluded: "One presumes these methods of coercion would not reappear
with such depressing regularity if they were ineffective." Id (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
118. Id. at 2770 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2771 (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. Id at 2772 (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Id (Stevens, J., concurring). The "restraint of trade" standard was upheld
against the same constitutional attack.
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victed, he concurred in the judgment on other grounds.122
IV. ANALYSIS, PROPOSALS, AND IMPACT
A. Analysis
One concept that must be kept in mind when examining the
Court's opinion is that the thirteenth amendment "is undoubtedly
self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are
applicable to any existing state of circumstances." 123 In light of this,
it would appear that the Court's reliance on a highly technical
method of statutory construction was misplaced. The conspiracy stat-
ute, section 241, prohibits interference with another's federally-se-
cured rights-those "secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States."124 Thus, the statute by its express terms called
for an analysis of the conduct that is prohibited by the thirteenth
amendment.125 While the Court's prior decisions on the scope of in-
voluntary servitude would certainly shed light on the inquiry, the
Court unnecessarily limited the statute's reach to precedent; the
Court had never specifically addressed the outer limits of the
prohibition.
Section 1584, the "holding" statute, admittedly presents a different
problem. Close inspection, however, would appear to render it open
to the same thirteenth amendment analysis applied to section 241.
The search for legislative intent is fraught with peril because without
specific legislative findings made a part of the record, the possibility
exists that 632 different intentions can be found behind an act's pas-
sage. As a consolidation of two prior statutes, section 1584 presents
the additional complexity of deciding what history is relevant.
All three courts which have addressed the legislative history of sec-
tion 1584 and its predecessors reached different conclusions as to its
relevance. In Shackney, the Second Circuit, recognizing that "it]he
two [parent] statutes.., had purposes and effects different from each
122. Id. at 2774 (Stevens, J., concurring).
123. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) (emphasis added).
125. In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966), the Court stated:
The language of § 241 is plain and unlimited. As we have discussed, its lan-
guage embraces all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all of the
Constitution and all of the laws of the United States. There is no indication in
the language that the sweep of the section is confined to rights that are con-
ferred by or "flow from" the Federal Government, as distinguished from
those secured or confirmed or guaranteed by the Constitution.
I&0
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other and from their 'consolidation,' " determined that its search
"must be for the meaning of § 1584 rather than of its two parents."1 26
In Kozminski, however, the Sixth Circuit expressed its belief that "it
is a mistake to read § 1584 in isolation from the older statutes which
produced it."127 Finally, the Supreme Court majority in Kozminski
reached yet a third conclusion: Section 1584 should stand on its own,
but should be constued as understood "at the time of [its] enact-
ment," that is, under the Court's decisions up to that time. 28 Justice
Brennan also believed his position was "strongly bolstered by the leg-
islative history."129
The variance of opinion on this matter suggests that rather than
engage in illusive searches for legislative intent, 3 0 a court should
preferably take the statute at face value as prohibiting the same in-
voluntary servitude found in the self-executing thirteenth
amendment.
The majority in Kozminski recognized that use of the amend-
ment's "pivotal phrase, 'involuntary servitude'" in the statute,
"makes the conclusion that Congress intended the phrase to have the
same meaning in both places logical, if not inevitable."'' 1 Moving
this far, it might have been expected that the Court would give the
statute a reach that paralleled that of the amendment. Instead, the
Court restricted section 1584's reach to its own case law as of the
time of enactment.i3 2 Due to the statute's enabling character, which
was intended to give the executive branch power to enforce the thir-
teenth amendment,i33 the use of "involuntary servitude" in the stat-
126. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 482 (2d Cir. 1964). Adding to the con-
fusion over the relevance it ascribed to the statute's history, the court nevertheless
read section 1584 as "covering the same type of compulsory holding as was proscribed
by its parent statutes." Id. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless concluded that "Judge...
Friendly did not draw on the old statute in framing a standard under § 1584." United
States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1987).
127. Kozminski, 821 F.2d at 1191.
128. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (1988).
129. Md at 2767 (Brennan, J., concurring).
130. It would certainly not have been the first time the Court expressed wariness
about the validity of legislative history and reviser's notes in construing federal stat-
utes. In Price, noting that the 1874 revision of section 242 was in actuality a marked
departure from its predecessor, the Court said: "The substantial change thus effected
was made with the customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely
clarified and reorganized without changing substance." United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 803 (1966).
131. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2761.
132. Id Justice O'Connor noted that in 1948, at the time of section 1584's enact-
ment, "all of the Court's decisions identifying conditions of involuntary servitude had
involved" actual or threatened physical or legal coercion. Id. This is not surprising
since these were the only types of cases that had come before the Court. This lends
little support to a conclusion that Congress intended the statute's reach to be so
limited.
133. See Brodie, supra note 7, at 390.
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ute should have been read as a mirror of, and equivalent to, the
amendment.
B. A Proposal for a Constitutional Definition of Involuntary
Servitude.
An analysis of the scope of involuntary servitude should be limited
to the prohibitions found in the thirteenth amendment itself. This
was clearly the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Mussry,134
and implicitly that of Judge Dimock in Shackney135 and Justice Ste-
vens in Kozminski.S6
Freed of "the narrow window" 3 7 of statutory construction, invol-
untary servitude should properly be viewed as one of those "[g]reat
concepts . . .purposely left to gather meaning from experience."138
What experience has shown here is that involuntary servitudes have
come about by means other than physical and legal coercion.139 The
Court itself has recognized that what it denounces is "a status or con-
dition, irrespective of the manner ... by which it was created."140
The term should be given an expansive scope, bounded only by the
constitutional consideration of notice. This concern can be overcome
134. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U,S.
855 (1948).
135. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concur-
ring). See Shapiro, supra note 30, at 84 (noting that Judge Dimock's definition "is
couched in terms of the plain meaning accorded the word 'involuntary' ").
136. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2773 (1988) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). A primary focus on the language alone clearly indicates a coextensive reading of
the amendment and statute.
137. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2761.
138. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). One author has made the following comment regarding
the language chosen for the thirteenth amendment:
Perhaps due to their misunderstanding of the institution, the framers did
not write their oratory concerning natural rights into the Constitution.
Neither, however, did they specify that henceforth one man could not own an-
other. The language they did choose may at least be seen as lying in a middle
range between "specific" and "great" concepts. Although seemingly narrow, it
appears to have been designed as a full response to the evil perceived. As
modern perceptions of that evil grow, the response may take on increasingly
broader scope.
Note, supra note 1, at 1302.
139. See, e.g., Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2767 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
Shackney, 333 F.2d at 487 (Dimock, J., concurring). "It is impossible to generalize the
means by which the will of man may be subjugated .... To a drug addict the threat of
deprivation of his supply is certainly more overbearing than the threat of almost any
kind of force." Id.
140. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1904).
without resort to the strict limitations prescribed by Kozminski. The
primary thrust of notice is that ordinary people should be able to un-
derstand what conduct is prohibited. 141 Surely the concept of com-
pelling another to work against his will is something the ordinary
person is capable of understanding. Though differentiating between
persuasion and coercion may be difficult in the hard case,142 hard
facts do not alone render a law vague. 4 3
The second reason for requiring that criminal statutes be defined
with sufficient definiteness is to discourage arbitrary or discrimina-
tory enforcement.14 4 This is, in essence, the other side of the coin.
The defendant must have notice that his conduct is unlawful, and the
jury must have proper criteria for judging that conduct. The basis for
such criteria can be found in the Ninth Circuit's three-pronged ap-
proach in Mussry: the defendant (1) must have specifically intended
to coerce the victim into service; (2) must have committed specific
wrongful acts to further that goal; and (3) must have succeeded in
holding the vicitim against his will.'45 These elements would provide
a structure for the type of case by case analysis suggested by Justice
Stevens.146 In addition, the requirement of overtly wrongful conduct
would help eliminate the pitfalls of the "no tolerable alternative" test
advocated by the government in Kozminski.147
The Court has recognized that a requirement of specific intent
"goes a long way toward alleviating any vagueness problems."148 In
order to provide an objective indicator of this intent, the prosecution
should be required to show a specific wrongful act or acts by the de-
fendant, such as the taking of the Indonesian servants' passports and
return tickets in Mussry,149 or perhaps an extortionate demand. The
141. "[N]o individual may be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his
conduct is prohibited." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (quoted in
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1148, 1454 (9th Cir. 1948)).
142. As Judge Dimock said, "What to one man is a paralyzing threat is to another
merely a harsh alternative." Shackney, 333 F.2d at 487.
143. "Statutes are not, however, void for vagueness because they raise difficult
questions of fact. They are void for vagueness only where they fail to articulate a defi-
nite standard [citations omitted]. I should not have thought that a statute fixing invol-
untariness as a standard would fall within that class." Id at 488 (Dimock, J.,
concurring).
144. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1454 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)); see
also Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2763.
145. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
146. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2772 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. Id at 2763. The Court felt the government's test appeared "to criminalize a
broad range of day-to-day activity," citing as examples a parent's withdrawal of affec-
tion to coerce an adult child's behavior and a political or religious leader's use of cha-
risma "to induce others to work without pay." Id. The added requirement of wrongful
acts, if understood not to include something the person has a legal right to do, would
remove such cases from the statute's reach.
148. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1455.
149. See supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
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act must be something the defendant had no legal right to do. Thus,
enforcement of the promissory notes in Shackney would not have
been such an act, as correctly noted by Judge Friendly.15o
Finally, this act (or acts) must have led to an actual state of invol-
untary servitude. The government must show that the defendants
actually and reasonably believed that they had no tolerable alterna-
tive but continued service. This element alone is clearly of equal im-
portance to the other two; no matter how reprehensible the intent or
actions of the defendant, if these acts did not actually cause the vic-
tim to serve against his will, the defendant has committed no crime.
The focus on the victim's state of mind is tempered by the require-
ment that the belief be a reasonable one. Evidence of other choices
the defendant might have had is not only highly relevant but would
often provide the best defense. If the defendant can show the alleged
victim had a tolerable alternative, such as mere deportation to his
homeland as in Shackney,1Sl then an essential element will remain
unproven.
This approach would allow maximum breadth to the amendment
while both ensuring that the defendant has proper notice that his
conduct is prohibited and discouraging arbitrary enforcement.1 52
Self-executing though it may be, the thirteenth amendment cannot
be self-policing. The only real enforcement takes the form of execu-
tive action.153 That branch should be given the authority to fully im-
plement "this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom
of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government.' 15 4
The great majority of cases brought under the enforcement stat-
utes construed in Kozminski will not be affected by this holding, as
most involve physical or legal compulsion.15 5 However, cases involv-
150. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 44 and 49 and accompanying text.
152. The government's "no tolerable alternatives" test was essentially criteria (1)
and (3) proposed herein-that is, specific intent and success in holding another to in-
voluntary servitude. The Court felt that the completely subjective focus on the vic-
tim's state of mind "fail[ed] to give any objective content" to the crime; thus, the
specific intent requirement amounted "to little more than an assurance that the de-
fendant sought to do 'an unknowable something.'" Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2763. The
added requirement of an overt wrongful act, however, gives an objective indication of
the defendant's intent. Furthermore, as the Court in Muasry stated: "It is difficult to
argue that a person did not have. notice that certain conduct was illegal when the of-
fense requires that the conduct be improper or wrongful and that the actor intend that
the conduct have a coercive effect." Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1455.
153. See supra note 7.
154. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872).
155. The judgment in Kozminski itself was to remand. The Court found sufficient
ing some form of involuntary servitude arise with "depressing regu-
larity."156 In those cases lacking the requisite compulsion, the
threshold of involuntary servitude need not and should not be set so
high. Since the Court rested its decision on statutory grounds, Con-
gress is free to formulate a broader definition than that adopted by
the Court. 5 7 Nevertheless, the burden of legislative inertia should
not be placed on a group which by its very nature is unable to speak
for itself and is invisible to those who would be willing to speak for
it.
V. CONCLUSION
Kozminski's holding that physical or legal compulsion is required
to constitute the law involuntary servitude will remain for the fore-
seeable future. Although four Justices would have opted for a
broader determinative framework, it took twenty-four years for the
first borderline "involuntary servitude" case to reach the Court; it is
unlikely the Court will accept another one soon. It is also unlikely
that Congress will address the issue; redefining involuntary servitude
will simply not rank high enough on an over-crowded agenda.
All of this makes Kozminski an even more onerous decision. The
only real opportunity for relief to those whose service is in any sense
involuntary is through executive enforcement action. Kozminski
makes enforcement of the thirteenth amendment's prohibition more
difficult for the government. Its undoubted result will be to cause
greater hesitation to act at all in borderline cases where physical or
legal coercion is not apparent. Had Kozminski been the law when
Molitoris and Fulmer were removed from the Kozminski's farm, they
might still be there.
Having chosen a strict statutory construction over constitutional
analysis, the Court's opinion on the latter is an unknown. Because
the desision in Kozminski closed the only effective route to reaching
a constitutional decision, the self-executing thirteenth amendment
will sometimes be left without content to execute.
KENNETH T. KOONCE, JR.
evidence of physical coercion on which a jury could properly convict the defendants
even under its stricter standard. Many modern "involuntary servitude" cases involve
blatant physical force, usually against migrant farm workers. See United States v.
Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3554 (1984); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1007 (1978).
156. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. at 2767 (Brennan, J., concurring).
157. See Shapiro, supra note 30, at 84 (arguing that the task "is one more ideally
suited to the legislature").
